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The Evolution of Ideology, Fairness and
Redistribution
Alberto Alesina, Guido Cozziy, and Noemi Mantovanz
December 18, 2009
Abstract
Ideas about what is "fair" above and beyond the individualsposition
in the income ladder inuence preferences for redistribution. We study
the dynamic evolution of di¤erent economies in which redistributive poli-
cies, perception of fairness, inequality and growth are jointly determined.
We show how including fairness explains various observed correlations be-
tween inequality, redistribution and growth. We also show how di¤erent
beliefs about fairness can keep two otherwise identical countries in di¤er-
ent development paths for a very long time.
1 Introduction
The poor want to tax the rich, but that is not all what determines redistributive
policies. Ideas about what is "fair" and about what is an acceptable level of
inequality above and beyond the individualsposition in the income ladder also
matter.1 The same level of inequality may be more or less acceptable by di¤erent
individuals in di¤erent countries depending upon their beliefs that wealth has
been accumulated with e¤ort and ability rather than by luck, connections or
even corruption. In one word whether di¤erent levels of income and wealth are
"deserved" or not.2 These views about inequality and justice (which we may
label "ideology") determine tax rates and the evolution of the distribution of
income and wealth. But the latter itself generates changes in the proportion of
wealth inequality due to e¤ort or to other factors including luck and government
intervention, thus changing individual views about redistribution.
Harvard University and IGIER
yDurham University
zUniversity of Glasgow
1See for instance the recent survey of preferences for redistribution by Alesina and Giuliano
(2010) and the references cited therein. Alesina, Di Tella and McCulloch (2004) discuss
di¤erent levels of inequality tolerance in various countries. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) focus
on a comparison between Continental Europe and US. Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide
an excellent overview of politico economic models of redistributive policies.
2See Fong (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina and Giuliano (2010).
1
In this paper we provide a politico economic model that can trace over time
the evolution of polices (tax and transfer schemes), the evolution of inequal-
ity, and of the preferences for redistribution, as a function of changes in what
individuals perceive as fair and unfair wealth di¤erences. The introduction of
concerns for fairness reconciles several empirical observations which would be
inconsistent with models based upon individual income (and position in the
income ladder) as the only determinant of the votersviews about taxes and
transfers.
In our model di¤erent generations of voters are linked by bequests, thus re-
distributive policies in the past and past beliefs about what was fair inuence the
current generations preferences. We are especially interested in two issues. One
is how di¤erent initial conditions lead to long lasting di¤erences in policies. The
other one is how shocks to inequality imply di¤erent policy reactions. Regard-
ing the rst issue we study not only di¤erences in the initial conditions of the
economic system, but also, and perhaps more interestingly, di¤erences in views
about social justice and about the fairness of the inherited level of inequality.
For instance two countries may be completely identical except for their views
about the fairness of their initial inequality, and as a result they may adopt
di¤erent redistributive policies over a long period of time which determines dif-
ferent wealth and inequality dynamics. These di¤erent patterns of taxation,
inequality, and growth would be completely unexplainable without reference to
initial views about what is fair or not, i. e. about social justice. These exam-
ples allow us to explain, for instance, di¤erent levels of redistribution between
the US and Europe and their persistence along the lines of Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) who stressed, informally, the role of the perception of poverty as an ex-
planation of US versus Europe. We also show that for some parameter values
economies with di¤erent initial beliefs but otherwise identical converge slowly to
the same steady state. But for other parameter values identical economies but
with di¤erent initial beliefs converge to two di¤erent steady states, thus their
di¤erences persist forever. Another implication of our model is that, contrary to
standard result from the Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, more inequality
may be associated with less redistribution. This is because di¤erent levels of
measured inequality may be considered more or less fair. 3 .
The second set of results concerns the e¤ect of shocks to wealth inequality
like those generated by wars (Piketty and Saez, 2003) or possibly the 2007-2009
nancial crisis. Sudden exogenous shocks to inequality may generate very dif-
ferent policy reactions depending on the perception of individuals about who
lost and who gained, namely if those who lost were those who were rich be-
cause of "luck" (broadly dened) or were those who had become rich because
of e¤ort and ability. Thus the same changes in inequality may have di¤erent
e¤ects on redistributive policies depending on the nature of how these shocks
are perceived. An innovative feature of our model is that we can trace not only
the evolution of wealth, inequality, and redistributive policies, but also of the
3See in fact Perotti (1996) and Bénabou (1996) for empirical evidence regarding this rela-
tionship.
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views about "fairness" in society, that is we can measure how much of the total
inequality is considered fair at di¤erent points in time. We can also examine
the e¤ects of changes on peoples views about fairness.
This paper is related to the work of Alesina and Angeletos (2005a,b) but it
is richer in its dynamic dimension and it uses a di¤erent voting mechanism. We
adopt as our benchmark the same denition of fairness as theirs, but we also
analyze di¤erent denitions and we emphasize the transition to the steady state,
which may take a long time. Also, unlike those authors who use a median voter
model, we adopt a probabilistic voting framework, which is a more exible tool
to analyze various types of distribution of political inuence. The inuence of
beliefs about e¤ort as a determinant of redistributive policies has been analyzed
in a di¤erent context by Bénabou and Tirole (2006). In their paper, beliefs are
not shaped only by actual data, but also by agentstargets and psychological
needs. 4
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model:
both the economy and the political aspects of it, and the equilibrium. Section 3
illustrates the dynamic evolution of the model and performs several experiments.
The last section concludes. The Matlab codes used in the present paper are
available from the authors upon request.
2 The economy
We have non overlapping generations of individuals, indexed by t. Population is
constant, there is one active individual per-family, and the total mass of families
is normalized to one. Each individual, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], lives for one period
and is characterized by a certain degree of endurance to e¤ort, i > 0, luck,
i 2 R, and inner abilities, Ai > 0; average luck is zero, that is
Z 1
0
idi = 0.
These family-specic variables are assumed, for now, fully persistent over time.
In an extension below we also allow for non persistent luck. Each individual i
cares about consumption, cit, and how much wealth to bequeath to the next
generation, kit - which we label "capital" - and negatively on his e¤ort, eit, on
the job. All choice variables are constrained to be non-negative. The private
utility function is:
uit =
1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it  
1
2i
e2it,
0 <  < 1. The nal life gross wealth is:
zit = Aieit + i + kit 1. (1)
4 In the present paper beliefs are consistent with reality. The fact that past experiences
and views about history a¤ect beliefs is consistent with Piketty (1995) who analyzes the
dependence of the redistributive preferences on past income.
3
For simplicity, initial capital is assumed to yield no returnt. Each generation
votes on the tax rate,  t, which is proportionally applied to end-of-life gross
wealth zit; all tax revenues are to be redistributed lump sum to all individuals.
Hence, we denote nal life post-tax and transfer wealth as:
wit = (1   t)zit +Gt, (2)
where Gt =  t
Z 1
0
zitdi is the percapita transfer. The government budget
is always balanced. Notice that in our stylized economy, individual income is
yit = (Aieit + i) (1  t)  tkit 1+Gt, and the aggregate income of generation
t is
Yt =
1Z
0
[(Aieit + i) (1   t)   tkit 1 +Gt] di =
1Z
0
Aieitdi,
which is identical to percapita income due to the population normalization.
While in principle we allow for a negative individual income5 , in none of our
simulations individuals can have negative wealth.
This warm glow intergenerational altruism implies that fraction  of end of
life wealth is bequeathed, as seen by maximizing uit subject to cit + kit = wit.
Therefore, plugging the optimal consumption and bequest into the private utility
function, we obtain:
uit = wit   e
2
it
2i
. (3)
Individuals vote on taxation at the beginning of life, before deciding on e¤ort.
Maximizing uit, using (3), (1), and (2), gives
eit = (1   t)Aii,
which shows that individual e¤ort gets discouraged by expected taxation, and
is increasing in the individual work ability and decreasing in the disutility of
e¤ort6 .
The denition of a period needs discussion. In the model the period is one
generation and it is also the length of time for which the redistributive policy
cannot be changed. We solve the model below by computational methods and
not in closed form. Therefore it would be relatively straightforward to allow
many periods within one generation and allow for a vote on a tax rate in every
period, so many votes and possibly many tax changes within one generation.
However this complication would make the interpretation of the simulations
heavier without adding much to the basic message of the paper. In addition, the
5 In case an unlucky individual (i.e. some one with i < 0) exherts zero e¤ort, and redis-
tribution does not help enough.
6As in Heckman (2008), we could distinguish between cognitive abilities (here summarized
by Ai) and non-cognitive abilities (1=i).
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choice of a "tax rate" should not be interpreted as the day to day or year to year
changes in scal policy, but the broad redistributive stand of a certain period in
a certain country. For instance more redistribution in the US with the Great
Society in the Sixties, or with the New Deal in the Thirties, less redistribution
starting with Reagan in the Eighties and what followed. In Europe an increase
in redistribution at the end of the Sixties, possibly a slowing down today etc.
2.1 Inequality and fairness
In addition to the standard utility function described above, we postulate that
utility also depends negatively on some measure of inequality, i.e of wealth dis-
persion in society. In our benchmark case, as in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a)
we posit that individuals tolerate inequality coming from innate ability and
e¤ort, but are averse to inequality arising from everything else, luck and redis-
tribution.
More specically, let us dene "fair" utility and wealth as follows:
buit = bwit   e2it
2i
,
bwit = Aieit + bkit 1.
Remembering that each agent chooses kit = wit, where  represents the
generosity towards the next generation, we dene fair consumption, fair bequest,
and fair disposable wealth as:
bcit = (1  )bzit bkit = bzit bzit = bwit = Aieit + bkit 1. (4)
The generation t individual i utility, Uit, is dened as:
Uit = uit   
t, (5)
where

t =
1Z
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj = 1Z
0
(wjt   bwjt)2dj. (6)
and  > 0 is the parameter which measures the importance of unfairness for
society. This representation of utility implies that individuals in society dislike
deviations from a distribution of wealth/utility in which everybody gets only
the benets from e¤ort and innate ability. Note that the di¤erence between total
wealth and fair wealth is due to luck and government intervention with taxes
and transfers. The higher the tax rate, the lower the equilibrium choice of e¤ort;
therefore the larger is the percentage of individual income due to luck rather
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than e¤ort7 , and the larger the proportion of di¤erences across individuals due
to luck rather than e¤ort. In addition, to the extent that government transfers
are not included in the denition of fair luck because not due to e¤ort, this is
an additional channel through which higher taxes induce a higher proportion of
wealth perceived as not fair over the fair portion.
2.2 Alternative denitions of fairness
In the numerical simulations of the model. First we consider the case in which
tax and transfers are considered part of fair wealth. Second, we look at cases in
which the e¤ect of Ai is part of luck. One may argue that being born smart is
part of a sort of genetically induced "luck". Alternatively one may argue that
intelligence is fostered by growing up in a rich family with more child care and
investment in education. Again this could be considered part of the endowment
of an individuals luck at birth. Finally we consider the case in which individuals
dislike inequality per se, namely any deviation of wealth and utility from equality
for all at the average is costly. The latter would be an extreme denition of
fairness in which any di¤erence in wealth even if arising form harder work and
more e¤ort is unfair8 . We will indeed compare the dynamic evolution of the
economy under these di¤erent assumptions about tolerance for inequality and
the denition of fairness.
2.3 The polity
We use a probabilistic voting model9 . There are two parties - L , for "left", and
R, for "right" - each of which simultaneously and credibly commits to a tax
rate P 2 [0; 1], P = L, R, at the beginning of each period - coinciding with
a generation. The individuals vote for a party at the beginning of their life.
Then the individuals choose e¤orts. The party that obtained the majority of
the votes is the only one in o¢ ce, and it will apply the announced tax rate (to
end of life wealths) and will redistribute accordingly. Finally, individuals choose
their consumption and bequest.
Individuals have heterogeneous degrees of political party identication10 : the
complete utility function including economic variables and party identication
is the following:
~UitP = uit   
t + (it + "t)L(P ), where P = L;R.
Variable P denotes the party that wins the election, and can take on values L
( meaning "left") or R ("right"). Indicator function L(P ) takes on value 1 if
7Notice that, for unlucky individuals, that percentage has opposite sign.
8Perhaps in the extreme one might argue that ability to tolerate fatigue is also part of
someones endowment of lucky features.
9Note that this voting model does not require single peakness of preferences and has other
desirable properties. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an excellent presentation of it.
10Lindbeck and Weibull (1987 and 1993).
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P = L and 0 if P = R. Random variable it represents individual is pro-party
L ideological bias, while "t is an aggregate random variable capturing party Ls
popularity for generation t. While we assumed (for simplicity) that individu-
alspecuniary utility and ability shocks are fully persistent across generations,
that is it = i, it = i, and Ait = Ai, political popularity may change from
generation to generation both at the aggregate and at the family level. Each
generation, "t will be uniformly distributed on support
h
  12 ; 12 
i
, and indi-
vidual specic variables it are uniformly distributed on support
h
  12'i ;
1
2'i
i
.
All random variables are independent. Therefore, in the support of the corre-
sponding distrubutions, the density function of aggregate popularity of party L
is  > 0, and family-specic density functions are 'i > 0, with the correlated
(aggregate) component of the party identication assumed less variable than the
individual components - that is  > 'i, 8i 2 [0; 1]. The two parties commit to
their tax rates before they know the realization of the random variables "t and
it. They only care about winning the election, and hence choose their policies
Lt and 
R
t by trying to maximize the probability of being elected, pP , P = L,
R. This is consistent with maximizing the expected rents from being in o¢ ce11 .
The "popularity shocks" should not be viewed as the day ebbs and ows
of electoral politics. Given our denition of a period as one generation these
shocks should be seen as long term switches of one generation to the left (say
the sixties) or to the right, (say the eighties in the US).
2.4 Equilibrium
After simple substitutions, and momentarily neglecting the party L bias com-
ponents, we obtain the indirect utility function of each individual in each gener-
ation. That function ultimately depends on exogenous parameters, on expected
taxation and on all the wealth distribution of the previous generation:
Uit = [i(1   t) + i + kit 1] (1   t) +
1Z
0
[j(1   t) t +  tkjt 1] dj   (1   t)2 i
2
  
Z 1
0
24(s(1   t) + s + kst 1)(1   t) + 1Z
0
(j(1   t) t +  tkjt 1)dj   s(1   t)  bkst 1
352 ds
(7)
 U^it( t).
11Let P > 0 denote the (non-transferable) ego rent of party P = L, R, from being in
o¢ ce, the expected rent of party L will be LpL = L(1  pR); whereas party R maximizes
RpR = 
R(1  pL).
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Where i  A2ii. It is straightforward to see that (the proof is in Appendix):
Lemma 1. In pairwise majority voting, there will exist a unique equilibrium
in which the two parties will select the same policy variable, Lt = 
R
t  t , given
by
t = arg max
t2[0;1]
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di. (8)
As in other probabilistic voting models, the same equilibrium policy variable
would also be chosen by a biased social planner who maximized the following
weighted aggregate welfare functional:
W () 
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di,
with each individuals indirect utility function (where e¤ort, consumption, and
bequest are all optimal) being weighted inversely to vulnerability, 1='i, to party-
related attributes. In the special case of individuals who have the same densities
'i = ', Lemma 1 implies that 

t = argmaxt W ( t) would coincide with the
tax rate chosen by a social planner who adopts a utilitarian welfare functional.
Notice that, from eq. (7), the equilibrium tax rate t will depend on generation
t 1s bequest distribution kt 1, generation t 1s fair bequest distribution bkt 1,
and of course on the parameter vectors  and ; that is t = 
(kt 1;bkt 1; ; ).
2.5 Intergenerational Links
The equilibrium tax rate t determines the level of capital and fair capital
for each family of the current generation. Therefore the link between di¤erent
generations is summarized by the dynamics of kit and bkit:
kit = [i(1   t) + i + kit 1] (1   t)+ Gt (9)
bkit = i(1   t) + bkit 1. (10)
Based on these dynamic equations, we notice that the distribution of i
should be high enough relative to the support of the distribution of i in order
for nal life wealth never to be negative12 . In all our simulations, the relative
importance of mere luck is never overwhelming, and hence the non-negative
nal life wealth constraint is never violated.
12See Lemma 2 in the Appendix for a su¢ ciency condition.
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2.6 Discussion
Note that in eq. (10), fair bequest - i.e. of fair initial wealth, over the
generations - are obtained by removing from the parental end of life wealth, the
e¤ects of the luckvariable, i, and of the taxes paid to and transfers received
by the government. However, the indirect e¤ect of tax rates on individual
e¤orts is included in this denition of fairness. The reader may wonder why
"(1   t)" should enter the "fair wealth": after all, it is an individually rational
response to the distortion induced by taxation, and indeed eit = (1    t)Aii.
If redistribution did not exist in the model, the individual would have exerted a
rst best e¤ort level eFit = Aii. We have run simulations under such a di¤erent
view of fairness, based on "potential" rather than actual e¤orts, without much
change in the results about the dynamics of kit. By eq. (10), it simplies
the dynamics of bkit, which would tend to i1  . However, the results of our
computations do not change qualitatively.
Another objection could be raised against purging additive luck i rather
than both luck and ability Ai. Formally, luck enters additively while ability
as the marginal product of e¤ort: both could be viewed as "gifts of nature".
Replacing Ai with A =
R 1
0
Aidi would both be reasonable and consistent at
the macroeconomic level (fair value added = actual value added). Using Aeit =
A(1  t)Aii as the valued added component of the end-of-life wealth, however,
would not change the qualitative results much, as actual individual ability, Ai,
would still enter multiplicatively indirectly via optimal e¤ort choice. Purging
this e¤ect too, in addition to neglecting macroeconomic consistency, would not
change much13 .
3 Intergenerational Dynamics
Starting from an initial vector of actual and fair wealth levels, (ki0; k^i0)i2[0;1], we
can iterate the model and determine the intergenerational evolution of (kit; k^it)i2[0;1]
and t for all t 2 N . We use equations (7), problem (8), and eq.s (9) and (10),
which, once iterated for an arbitrary number of generations, allows to calculate
the sequence of equilibrium values of the endogenous variables of our dynamic
economy for all parameter vectors, initial wealth distribution, and initial fair
wealth distribution. By simulating the model for a su¢ ciently high number of
generations, we can approximate the stable steady state value of the endogenous
variables associated with each initial condition. The Matlab codes we have used
to generate our examples are available upon request.
Generation ts pair of distributions (kit; k^it)i2[0;1] describe the interaction of
real and "ideal" variables at time t. More precisely, the comparison between
how society currently is - the actual distribution (kit)i2[0;1] - and how society
13Notice that, while in the previous case replacing Ai with its expected value in the direct
abilities reduced the variance of i (due to the elimination of the quadratic exponent on
abilities), eliminating the variance of Ai completely could even increase the variance of i:
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thinks it "should be" - the fair distribution (k^it)i2[0;1] - sets the goals of the
political action; together with the method of political competition - i.e. pairwise
majority voting - this describes the political ideology prevailing for generation t
in that economy. The resulting political equilibrium generates the evolution of
(kit+1; k^it+1)i2[0;1], and therefore the political ideology (i.e policy goals) prevail-
ing in the next generation. Thus we trace the evolution of ideology, fairness and
redistribution, as well as the aggregate GDP percapita. We focus our attention
on the e¤ects of:
1. di¤erent initial beliefs about the fair wealth distribution (sub-section 3.1).
2. di¤erent initial inequality (section 3.2).
3. alternative denitions of fairness (section 3.3).
4. di¤erent initial levels of aggregate wealth and poverty traps (section 3.4).
5. temporary shocks to wealth inequality (section 3.5).
3.1 Di¤erent Initial Ideas about Social Justice
As suggested by Alesina and Glaeser (2004), part of the long term di¤erences
in the welfare states in US and Europe can be explained by the interplay of
initial conditions and ideas of fairness. A society where citizens believe that the
observed cumulated wealth di¤erences are derived from previous family luck will
choose to redistribute more than a society in which voters think that the current
capital accumulation depended on past e¤orts and talents. In Europe, preex-
isting forms of feudalism and wealth related to nobility di¤ered from the US,
where modern capitalism developed without a long previous history of privilege
and class di¤erences. In this section, we simulate the dynamics of two societies,
characterized by identical real economic and personal characteristics, but with
di¤erent initial ideas of the fair wealth distribution. In the rst country, A,
every individual of generation 0 believes that all the inequality is unfair, namely
the initial wealth levels of their cohort should be equal to be fair. At the other
extreme, the citizens of country B are initially convinced that the prevailing
capital distribution is exactly the fair one.
Considering Figure 1a below, two economies identical in all market funda-
mentals, including inequality, but that at some point in their history a genera-
tion is born and it judges di¤erently the (same) prevailing wealth distribution.
In fact, our "period zero" is simply the start of our period of interest, but, of
course, a long history might have preceded the "initial generation" we are con-
sidering, which otherwise would have started with no initial capital. Therefore
a di¤erent way of interpreting this results is this: all of the sudden in an unex-
pected matter a new generation is born with extremely egalitarian views, with a
break of the past. Thus we study how a new egalitarian generation of individ-
uals might a¤ect the resulting political equilibrium and economic performance
10
over the subsequent generations.
Figure 1a . Solid Line: Country A. Dashed Line: Country B
(11)
Figure 1a shows that, as a consequence of their perception of unfairness
in the initial wealth distribution, country As voters chose a high tax rate in
period zero. This reduces inequality (even in the rst period), but it also induces
the successive generations to consider unfair the part of their inherited wealths
stemming from the redistribution driven unearned changes in their predecessors
wealth. To correct the combined sources of unfairness still requires high taxes
for a su¢ ciently long sequence of generations. Meanwhile, this does not take
place in country B, where as a consequence work e¤ort is higher and capital
accumulation faster.
Individual preferences and the equilibrium tax rate (something we can name
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ideology) evolve from generation to generation. Consider country A. The rst
generation judges all inequality unfair; the second generation will believe their
parentsideal of their generations fairness, but it will attribute part of the cur-
rent pre-tax inequality to the e¤orts and abilities of their generations members:
therefore the desired tax rate will be lower. Incidentally note that the high tax
rate chosen by the rst generation in country A will induce a relatively low
choice of e¤ort and work, and therefore the percentage of individual wealth due
to luck is relatively high, thus the tax rate desired by generation 1 will still be
relatively high. In country B the rst generation will not tax inequality because
they perceived it as fair. Obviously the chosen tax rate will not be zero due
to the need for correcting the e¤ect of luck on unfairness within their cohort.
But then the following generation will perceive that some of the inherited in-
equality is due to luck and therefore will choose to tax it. Unlike country A,
since the initial tax rate was quite low much of the inequality within generation
1 will be due to e¤ort, not luck, and therefore the chosen tax rate will not be
much higher than in period zero. This shows that the two countries will remain
rather di¤erent in terms of policy goals and tax/transfer redistributive schemes
for many periods/generations. Initial conditions matter much. Policy goals (ide-
ology) evolve over time together with the evolution of the economy, but initial
di¤erences in perception imply long lasting di¤erences across countries.
More precisely, let us review the evolution of ideology implicit in eq. (10):bkit = i(1    t) + bkit 1. Individuals belonging to generation t believe that
every member of their cohort should bequeath a wealth level that reects the
bequest parental choice of a fraction, , of their end of life wealth; however
that fraction should have been taken provided they earned the "fair" end-of-life
wealth, given by bzit = i(1    t) + bkit 1. Thus individuals believe in the idea
of fairness of their parents (as from the presence of "+bkit 1" in the formula);
however, since the term "i(1   t)" is just the equilibrium value of Aieit, they
also believe that the additional "fair" income of their peers should only arise
from their individual e¤orts and productive abilities. Since, in turn, the e¤ort
chosen by the individual turns out to be equal to eit = (1  t)Aii, its level will
also reect the individuals love for work, indeed represented by i. Thus the
view of fair versus unfair inequality evolves from generation zero to generation
1 and this will imply di¤erent choices of tax rates and di¤erent bequests. The
same considerations apply in the transition from generation 1 to 2, and one can
simulate the model forward to trace the transition to a steady state.
As shown in Figure 1b, we can keep track of the level of the variance of the
wealth distribution viewed as fair by all the future generations in country A: as
we can see, that level increases over time. The o¤spring of a very egalitarian
generation, though agreeing with their parents view of the world of their times,
by critically assessing the productive participation by their peers, will become
increasingly more tolerant of wealth disparities.
12
Figure 1b
In summary, di¤erences in ideas of social justice of a generation can persist
for several generations. These ideas evolve slowly together with the evolution
of the economy.
Note that for some parameter values we have multiple steady states. In
such cases, the strictly egalitarian ideology prevailing in an initial generation in
country A can support very strong redistributive policies. High enough taxation
would then discourage individual e¤orts so dramatically that a large part of
individuals wealths would be the result of luck, and hence deemed very unfair.
Therefore, the next generation would decide to tax a lot as well. In the long
run the unfairness/redistribution/poverty trap would never be corrected, and
the two economies would di¤er in everything, with country B richer, but more
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unequal, than country A.
3.2 Initial Inequality
In a dynamic version of the Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, higher initial
inequality leads to more redistribution, higher taxes and lower capital accumu-
lation and growth. This is the prediction of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and
Persson and Tabellini (1994). It is straightforward to reproduce this result in
our framework. Imagine two countries with di¤erent initial level of inequality
and in which there is no di¤erence across countries about how much of the
initial inequality is fair or not, and  is the same in the two countries. Then
there would be higher taxes and more redistribution in the country with more
inequality. Simulations along those lines are available from the authors.
However, Perotti (1996) rst and then others have questioned empirically,
the positive correlation relationship between more pre tax inequality and redis-
tribution.14 A negative correlation between initial inequality and redistribution
can be easily obtained in our model. Imagine two countries, with di¤erent levels
of initial inequality, but suppose that in the country with more inequality the
latter is considered fair, while in the other country the inequality, even though
lower, is considered unfair. Imagine also that in the second country the parame-
ter  is especially high, namely in this country citizens are especially averse to
inequality (unfairly induced). One can easily generate examples in which more
inequality leads to less redistribution. One needs di¤erent ratios of fair versus
unfair inequality and/or di¤erent weights given in the two countries to the cost
of inequality and unfairness.
Another reason why inequality may not lead to more but less redistribution
is the case when more inequality leads to a stronger inuence of rich voters in the
political equilibrium. 15 So far, in our probabilistic voting framework, we have
worked under the assumption of common values of 'i for all i 2 [0; 1]. However,
this may not be the case, as di¤erent voters are di¤erently reactive to the parties
announcement of di¤erent policies, based on the relative importance they give
to ideological and personal characteristics associated with the di¤erent parties.
Our model allows all possible assumptions about the individual political biases.
When the rich have larger political inuence and when wealth is correlated to
more political inuence redistribution is lower. This will of course imply higher
growth and a larger Gini. All the simulations regarding these cases are available
upon request.
3.3 Di¤erent views about what is fair
In this section we analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent views about fairness, by com-
paring three countries.
14See also Bénabou (1996) for a survey.
15See Baremboim and Karabarbounis (2009) for some cross country empirical evidence on
this point and Mc Charty Poole and Rosenthal (2008) for a discussion on the United States.
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1) Country A is our benchmark case and we assume  = 0:1. Thus individ-
uals in country A have preferences described by eq.s (5) and (6);
2) In country B  = 0: This is the traditional Meltzer-Richard case in which
redistribution occurs only for selsh reasons, namely the poor want to tax the
rich and there is no distinction between fair and unfair inequality;
3) In Country C, individuals are averse to inequality per se, as measured by
the variance of end-of-life post-tax wealth, wit, that is individuals in country C
have preferences for redistribution in which:

Ct = var(wit). (12)
In Figure 2 we compare the performance of economies with everything else
equal, but the three di¤erent concepts of social justice.
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Figure 2
As in the gure, country B immediately starts with no redistribution (the
tax rate always stays on the horizontal axis: Bt = 0, for all t (= 1; 2; :::),
whereas countries A and C approach steady states with positive redistribution.
The reason why the usual inequality-redistribution channel is not at work in
country B is probabilistic party loyalty, along with the symmetric party bias
among the citizens. However, positive taxation emerges also in the  = 0 case
as soon as we introduce asymmetric policy bias. Thus the fact that in this
experiment Bt = 0 is just a special case, but in any case country B would have
lower taxes than countries A and C. In our example, country B will become
persistently richer than country A, which in turn gets richer than country C.
In this example, country As tax rate tends to 32.63%, while country Cs tax
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rate tends to 50.38%.
3.4 A Poverty Trap
By poverty trap we mean a situation in which a country does not manage to exit
poverty because the policies induced by poverty itself are not growth enhancing.
Consider two economies sharing the same distribution of luck, willingness to
work, and inner abilities, but di¤erent initial levels and distributions of capital
and fair capital. Assume that one economy, A, starts from a low and unequal
level of capital endowment; while the other, B, from a high and similarly unequal
level of capital endowment, as shown in Figure 3a:
Figure 3a . Solid Line: Country A. Dashed Line: Country B
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In both countries the initial level of fair wealth is set equal to the actual
initial wealth distribution16 . This example is representative of cases in which,
when the country is poor, the luck component represent a larger share of real-
ized wealth, and this induces the voters to prefer a high level of taxation. The
poorer country starts with a higher redistribution, while the rich country sim-
ply increases redistribution at a lower pace. This in turn disincentives e¤orts
and capital accumulation, thereby causing lower aggregate wealth accumulation.
The country is cast for long into a poverty trap; with high taxes and low wealth.
Eventually, after some generations, in the previous gure, the poorer country
starts slowly to accumulate more capital and to vote for reducing tax rates.
Growth starts to increase and the poorer country tends to catch up with the
other countrys level of capital and taxation. The evolution of the concept of
fairness plays a very important role also in this case. As the generations pass
by, the agents in the poorer country start to consider more and more fair the
di¤erences in the capital accumulation deriving from the abilities and the e¤orts.
In this way taxation decreases and the capital accumulation can nally take o¤.
However, by slightly altering the parameters, we can provide examples in
which the poverty trap is more extreme, as shown in Figure 3b below17 :
16This is to avoid the consequences of imposing unexplained (hence arbitrary) fairness moti-
vated initial redistributive policies. Of course, over the generations the fair and unfair wealth
distributions will di¤erentiate, thereby endogenously inducing unfairness driven redistributive
decisions.
17To generate this kind of examples, it su¢ ces to slightly increase the value of  and to
slightly increase the dispersion of the luck distribution.
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Figure 3b . Solid Line: Country A. Dashed Line: Country B
In this example, we have assumed that country B starts ten times poorer
than country A, while both countries believed their own initial wealth distrib-
ution to be fair (to avoid adding interfering ingredients). In country B, sheer
poverty implies that a large part of people end-of-life wealth is due to luck,
which causes the election of very highly redistributive policy platforms. Once
in place, they will discourage individual e¤orts, thereby causing luck to play a
central role in individual enrichment; this in turn reinforces the perception of
unfairness in the wealth distribution, and corroborates drastically redistribu-
tive policies, thus perpetuating the poverty trap. Country B will never catch
up with country A: it will rather converge to a di¤erent steady state wealth
distribution, characterized by more poverty, more taxation, and less inequality.
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It should be noted that very poor countries often do not have a well developed
tax structure. Often in these countries redistributive policies take even more
distorting forms often associated with corruption and in many cases ethnic poli-
tics. All the factors would make matters even worse and increase the chances of
a poverty trap. Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2007) discuss reason why free market
capitalist institutions may be fragile in developing countries precisely because
the wealth inequality generated in those countries are (perhaps correctly so)
perceived as generated by corruption and connections rather than abilities and
e¤ort.
3.5 Shocks to Wealth Distribution
Inequality is generally a slow moving variable, but a few large events can a¤ect
it quite much for a few years. Wars have been one example of such events,
which have reduced wealth disparities by much. (Piketty and Saez, 2003). The
nancial crisis of 2007-2009 may also have deep e¤ects on inequality, both on
its actual measure and the perception of fairness of certain types of riches
accumulated in nancial markets, pre-crisis CEO and bankers bonuses, etc.
What are the e¤ects on scal policy and the evolution of inequality of these
shocks? The next two sections show that opposite e¤ects on policy may arise,
depending on how the wealthy classeslosses are judged by the voters.
3.5.1 Shocks which equalize capital holdings
We can trace the e¤ect of a shock in our stylized economy, by assuming that at
some date - say, generation 4 - in country B - otherwise identical to country A -
there is an unexpected shock that cuts all initial capital levels at a ceiling equal
to 70% of the highest inherited capital level. We maintain the assumption of
initial distribution viewed as fair. Figure 4 shows what would happen without
the shock (country A) and with the shock (case B):
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Figure 4
Since the shock is equalizing wealth levels, there is a temporary negative
e¤ect on the equilibrium tax rate due to the fairness motive: "too rich" wealth
levels would be curtailed by the shock while "too poor" wealths are relieved by
tax reduction. The reduction in redistribution is voted as soon as the shock
arrives and allows the economy to witness only a relatively weak negative tem-
porary e¤ect on income and on inequality. The economy will re-absorb them
completely within few generations. Moreover, the lower level of inequality fol-
lowing the shock has relatively persistent negative e¤ects on voted taxation
and positive e¤ects on capital accumulation. In fact, in the gures example,
the 10th generations (6 generations after the shock) tax rate in country A is
28.54% while in country B is 27.79%; similarly, country Bs percapita wealth is
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1.19% higher than country As percapita wealth.
3.5.2 Shocks which equalize individualsproductivities
Suppose now that the top individual abilities are curtailed: we will assume that
for one generation ~t (in the example of the gure ~t = 4) we have i~t = min{i,
0:60maxj2[0;1] j}. That is, we set a temporary ceiling for the abilities/stamina
equal to 60% of their highest level in normal times. Lower abilities are left
unchanged. Figure 5 shows the e¤ects:
Figure 5
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As we can notice in the gure, in country A there is no crisis, while in coun-
try B the shock arrives. As a consequence there is a relatively strong fall in the
growth rate of country B. Unlike in gure 4, here the crisis is followed by an in-
crease in redistribution: despite the crisisequalizing power, country Bs voters
choose more redistribution and higher tax rates. Why so? Fairness considera-
tions tilt scal policy in favour of higher redistribution: if it is not creativity
or hard work that pays o¤ the rich so much, then the relative importance of
unjustied "luck" (which may include all sorts of non-work related sources of
extra gains/losses18) increases. Therefore, the perception of unfairness in the
creation of wealth would be mounting, thereby inducing voters to increase re-
distribution and exacerbate the economic consequences of the crisis. As shown
in the example illustrated by Figure 5, in the generation after the crisis (gen-
eration 5), country As tax rate is 25.97% while country Bs tax rate is 31.5%.
Moreover, as the gure shows, these e¤ects could be persistent, which is not too
surprising once realized that higher tax rates introduce additional departures
from fairness, to be corrected by the next generation, and so on.
One of the e¤ects of the nancial crisis of 2007-09 might have been to con-
vince (rightly or wrongly) that much of the wealth built in the period leading
up to the crisis were due to "luck" . The comparison of the nancial market
to "a Las Vegas casino", where, in fact, you win mostly by luck, were com-
mon. Our model would predict that despite the fact that the crisis itself might
have reduced inequality, it would increase the political support for more re-
distribution precisely for a changed perception of what is "fair" wealth. The
political emphasis on salary caps for managers and bankers is supportive of this
interpretation.
3.5.3 Non-Persistent "Luck"
After reading the discussion in the previous section, 3.5.2, one may wonder
if our policy result hinges on the extreme assumption of perfectly persistent
intra-family "luck" it = i for all i 2 [0; 1] and all t = 0; 1; 2; :::: if luck was
not persistent, perhaps a negative shock on the most able individuals would
not entail a higher than usual weight of luck in income and wealth. To check
the robustness of this - along with other - result, we have run simulations by
assuming that for every generation t the inter-family luck vector at birth, it,
is independently drawn from a zero mean uniform distribution. This eliminates
luck persistence completely, thereby allowing a substantial degree of upwards
and downwards social mobility. Interestingly, all simulations we have performed
reproduce the regularity observed in the simpler deterministic case it = i: after
the ability-equalizing shock, the winning tax rate is always higher than in the
absence of the shock. A representative example is shown in the following Figure
5b:
18Outrageously high pensions by bailed-out bank managers, etc.
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Figure 5b
As seen from the gure, due to the stochasticity of the "luck" distribution,
here uctuations have been endogenously generated. We remark that, in our
simulations, the realizations of random luck vector, it, generated is the same
in both scenarios A and B, which explains why their cyclicity is correlated;
however, country B, represented by dashed lines, is subjected to a one time
ability ceiling (of 60% of the top ability, as in previous section 3.5.2) in period
4, whereas country A is not. In all cases we have tried, right after the negative
shock on the top abilities, the country B voters are more inclined to redistribute
than the voters of country A: the reason is that at the aggregate level, in the
generation hit by the shock, luck matters relatively more than ability in explain-
ing individual riches. Country Bs higher than usual taxation in one generation
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implies higher distortions (i.e. less e¤ort and lower production), hence higher
relative weights of luck, thereby inducing persistence in the propensity to vote
for higher tax rates. Despite uctuations led by changing luck distribution,
the e¤ects of a one time ability-equalizing crisis take some time to be fully re-
absorbed, with the two countries eventually converging to the same stochastic
process.
If the parameters are such that multiple (stochastic) steady states can arise,
the long term e¤ect of a temporary nancial crisis could be a persistent "soak
the rich" e¤ect, as shown in the following example:
Figure 5c
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In Figure 5c, despite the same realization of the luck vector, the arrival in
country B of a temporary negative shock to the top abilities triggers drastically
di¤erent economic performances: while country A follows a trajectory charac-
terized by very low taxation and very high percapita wealth, country B becomes
characterized by the periodic election of extremely high - even expropriatory -
tax rates, accompanied by much lower percapita wealths, and exhibiting much
higher growth volatility than country A.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how the evolution of the political ideology regard-
ing the fairness of the constellation of income and wealth in society can generate
economic and political persistence in inequality, redistribution, and growth. Ac-
cording to our simple framework, ideology does not entail cognitive distortions
of reality, but it shapes the moral judgement on what wealth distribution would
be fair, as well as it internalizes into peoples preferences how strongly the dis-
tance between the current wealth distribution and the fair one makes people
unhappy. Our model is consistent with a variety of observations about the re-
lationship between inequality, redistribution, and persistence of poverty which
could not be explained with more standard models of redistributive policies.
Rather than reviewing again our results, it is worth discussing possible exten-
sions to this framework. Probably the most interesting one would be to extend
the policy set of tax and transfer schemes. A particularly relevant one comes
to mind, namely inheritance taxation. This model with its emphasis on fairness
seems ideal to address issues of social justice like equalizing initial conditions
versus redistribution. That is, an alternative view about social justice could
be that everybody should start from the same initial conditions, and therefore
inherited wealth, no matter how generated, should be heavily taxed to equalize
everybody at birth. This of course would have implications on savings, capital
accumulation, and the amount of bequest, but the structure provided by this
model seems ideal to study this set of issues. Another generalization would be
to allow non linear tax structures to permit for more progressive income and
wealth taxation.
5 Appendix
Lemma 1. In pairwise majority voting, there will exist a unique equilibrium in
which the two parties will select the same policy variable, Lt = 
R
t  t , given
by
t = arg max
t2[0;1]
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di. (13)
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Proof. In fact, individual i of generation t will vote for party R if U^it(Rt ) >
U^it(
L
t )+it+ "t, that is if it < U^it(
R
t )  U^it(Lt )  "t. Given our assumption
on it, this event happens with probability
h
U^it(
R
t )  U^it(Lt )  "t
i
'i+
1
2 . Ag-
gregating over all individuals and using the law of large numbers, the fraction of
votes that goes to party R is: R =
Z 1
0
nh
U^it(
R
t )  U^it(Lt )  "t
i
'i +
1
2
o
di =Z 1
0
h
U^it(
R
t )  U^it(Lt )
i
'idi '"t+ 12 , where ' 
Z 1
0
'idi is the average of the
individual ideological densities. Party R wins if R > 12 , which happens if and
only if "t <
Z 1
0
[U^it(Rt ) U^it(Dt )]'idi
' . From our assumptions on "t, this happens
with probability
0BB@
Z 1
0
[U^it(Rt ) U^it(Dt )]'idi
'  
h
  12 
i1CCA =  
Z 1
0
[U^it(Rt ) U^it(Dt )]'idi
' +
1
2  pR. PartyR therefore chooses t = argmax pR = argmaxRt
Z 1
0
U^it(
R
t )'idi.
Swapping notations, partyD chooses t = argmax pD = argmaxDt
Z 1
0
U^it(
D
t )'idi.
By Weierstrass theorem a maximum certainly exists. Moreover, it is generically
unique. Q.E.D.
Lemma2. Let us assume that the distribution of abilities and luck are such
that inf

A2ii : i 2 [0; 1]
	
>   inf fi : i 2 [0; 1]g. Then wit  0 for all i 2
[0; 1],and t = 1; 2; :::, for every non-negative initial capital vector ki0, i 2 [0; 1],
and for every tax rate sequence  t 2 [0; 1].
Proof.
First notice that the above stated condition implies:
1Z
0
A2jjdj >   inf fi : i 2 [0; 1]g  jinf j. (14)
Let us consider the worst possible scenario, in which kit 1 = 0 for all i 2 [0; 1]:
if we are able to prove that kit = wit  0 in this case, then kit  0 will hold
in all other cases.
From the denition of end-of-life post-tax wealth, optimal e¤ort choice,and
government transfer, it easily follows that
wit = (1   t)zit+Gt = (1   t)2A2ii+(1   t)i+  t(1   t)
1Z
0
A2jjdj, (15)
which expresses wit as a quadratic function of  t. Hence, wit = 0 if and only if
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 t = 1 and
 t =   i +A
2
iiZ 1
0
A2jjdj  A2ii
. (16)
Let us rst focus on the  t = 1 root. Since in  t = 1, wit = 0, as  t becomes
lower than 1, we need to make sure that wit does not immediately become
negative: that is we want wit to be locally a decreasing function of  t. Taking
the derivative of wit with respect to  t we get:
dwit
d t
=  2(1   t)A2ii   i + (1   t)
1Z
0
A2jjdj    t
1Z
0
A2jjdj < 0 (17)
if and only if:
i >  2(1   t)A2ii + (1  2 t)
1Z
0
A2jjdj. (18)
Notice that if  t = 1 inequality (18) holds true if
i >  
1Z
0
A2jjdj, (19)
holds, which is a consequence of inequality (14).Clearly, this guarantees only
that wit > 0 for  t slightly less than 1:
Setting  t = 0 in (15), it becomes:
wit = A
2
ii + i, (20)
which is positive if A2ii >  i, which holds under the condition in the state-
ment. Hence, being wealth (15) quadratic in  t, the second root of wit = 0 -
given by eq. (16) - has to be negative if the corresponding parabola is concave
or larger than 1 if it is convex19 . In both cases, wit > 0 for all  t 2 [0; 1]. QED
19Simple graphing shows that any parabola y = ax2 + bx + c sloping down at x = 1 and
positive at x = 0, will be positive for all 0  x < 1.
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